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The Idea of Human Rights Between Value
Pluralism and Conceptual Vagueness
Gunnar Beck*
I. Introduction
Human or fundamental rights, two terms that will henceforth be
used interchangeably,1 enjoy a unique and privileged legal status in
Western liberal democracies. Unlike ordinary legislation which is
governed by the majoritarian principle, human rights alone are not
subject to the will of the majority.z While ordinary legislation can be
adopted only by representative institutions accountable to the electorate,
rights are handed down without a vote and enforced by unrepresentative
and unaccountable bodies. The courts are composed of judges who,
unlike politicians, cannot be removed from office or otherwise held
accountable; they are protected by the principle of judicial immunity,
even in cases of gross negligence or bias. Liberal democracies, in other
words, rest on two pillars: first, the principle of representative democracy
which requires majority consent for ordinary legislation and policy-
making, which is qualified by a second principle, that of fundamental
rights, which acts as a side-constraint on the majoritarian principle.
Human rights thus enjoy a privileged legal status that allows them to
override the majoritarian principle. It is in this sense that Ronald
Dworkin has described rights as trumps in liberal democracies. These
facts are not new but they cannot be overemphasised in view of the
conceptual and normative problems involved in the justification of rights.
* Gunnar Beck is a lecturer of law at the University of London's School of African
Studies and an adviser on European Union law to the British House of Commons in
London. He can be contacted at gbl8@soas.ac.uk.
1. They will also, on other occasions, simply be referred to as "rights" as there are
no other rights in issue in this discussion. The reason is purely stylistic, to avoid
unnecessary repetition of the adjectival attribute.
2. In Germany, for example, where most constitutional provisions can be amended
by a special procedure, the first nineteen articles of the Basic Law has the status of
Ewigkeitsklauseln or "perpetuity clauses," which cannot be changed for as long as the
present constitution is in place.
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In short, arguments in favour of assigning a special legal status to
human rights and entrusting their administration to unaccountable
decision-making bodies, i.e., the courts, generally run roughly as follows.
Amongst the wider range of human goods and values human rights can
be justified as meriting special protection and attention. The grounds for
justifying the special legal status assigned to rights are regarded to be of
such overriding importance that they are exempted from the democratic
process, which otherwise is recognised as the appropriate mechanism for
resolving conflicts between competing interests and values and placed
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts.3 This assumes, inter alia,
that human rights meet the criteria of legal certainty and justiciability;
otherwise, the courts would be free to impose their own values on their
interpretation. A justification of human rights and their privileged legal
status in liberal democracies thus must have both a normative and
conceptual certainty dimension. Both aspects are inter-related. A
normative justification is needed for two reasons: first, to establish and
justify the priority of human rights over other values, and, second, to
allow the judiciary to balance conflicting rights according to underlying
ethical principles; otherwise the trade-off would simply be morally
arbitrary. The need for conceptual certainty is closely related to the
second reason and embraces the need for certainty of the moral criteria
for adjudication between rights. Unless there can be a shared
understanding of the meaning of both the term 'right' as well as of the
meaning of individual rights and the central concepts they contain and
those justifying them, it will remain contentious why the courts should be
the appropriate forum for making judgments between those basic values
and interests which human rights are designed to protect. In summary,
without a normative justification it would remain unclear why human
rights should be granted special legal protection, and in the absence of
conceptual and legal certainty judges would simply be making policy and
law based on value judgments without adequate political legitimacy.
It is the central purpose of this paper to show that contemporary
human rights systems and the theoretical conceptions underlying them
ultimately fail on both counts. As regards the justification for the
privileged legal status afforded to human rights as opposed to other
values, it is argued that contemporary conceptions and systems of human
rights protection lack an adequate normative basis or even rational
3. Human rights are also often conceived and justified as second order preferences
designed to protect the settled preferences of the majority against its own temporary
desires. They hold the majority in check and to protect its best interests against its
fleeting opinions. The basic justificatory problem remains: Which interests, values, and
preferences are of such basic and lasting importance so at to justify exemption from the
normal channels of democratic politics and enforcement through the courts?
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criterion that could justify or even meaningfully communicate the
priority assigned to certain values which are raised to the status of legally
enforceable human rights, over other values that are not. Such systems
and conceptions, it is argued, generally rest-expressly or impliedly-on
the notion of value pluralism, which denies that there is a clear hierarchy
of human values and which assumes instead that there is a plurality,
though not an infinite number of, values which may not only conflict but
also be incommensurable. Value pluralism denies the possibility of
providing an objective, rational justification for choosing between certain
ultimate human goods and values. Applied to the sphere of rights, this
means, first, that where human rights are justified with reference to
certain underlying ultimate values in the sense that they either are
identified with certain values or represent conditions for their realisation,
there can be no rational basis for the priority accorded to these values as
opposed to other ultimate values which have not been given the same
legal status of human rights over other human goods. It means, second,
that where such rights derived from ultimate values conflict, there is no
rational basis for balancing between their conflicting demands. It
follows that the privileged status granted to human rights over rival other
values is ultimately morally arbitrary; it is political.
The same is true of judicial decisions involving choices delimiting
the scope of human rights and balancing their divergent requirements
where such rights may conflict, which reflects the need for but actual
absence of conceptual certainty in human rights and the very concept of
human rights. The proper role of the courts in human rights adjudication
consists in the application of human rights, whereas the basic value
judgments involved in laying down and defining the human rights is the
prerogative of the legislature, constitutional conventions or whichever
other body may be deemed to possess the requisite legitimacy for laying
down the highest norms of national or international law. It is argued that
this distinction between the making and application of human rights,
which is analogous to the distinction between making and interpreting
law, is untenable for at least four reasons. First, the idea of value
pluralism entails that there may be conflicts between rights to which
there is no objective, rational solution and which can only be resolved by
political judgments. Second, the concept of human rights as a priority
subset of the wider range of human goods is essentially contestable in the
sense that its meaning cannot be settled by rational-logical argument.
This claim is different from the first reason that refers to the possibility
of providing a normative justification for particular human rights and for
trade-offs between conflicting rights. It asserts that there is no right
answer to the question of what precisely is meant by the term human
rights, whether rights are negative or positive, waivable or inalienable, or
2007]
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vertical or horizontal in their application. Third, many concepts elevated
to rights status or featuring in their definition, underlying them, or
defining human rights limitations or qualifications are essentially
contestable, with the result that there is no demonstrably correct
interpretation of them which is better than others. Fourth, the principles
of human rights adjudication, like the concept of human rights
themselves, are themselves essentially contestable. Legal principles
serve to provide guidance to judges in so-called hard cases. The absence
of conceptually clear and precise principles of human rights adjudication,
however, means that they amplify rather than reduce the scope for
judicial discretion and value judgment. Value pluralism and essential
contestability mean not only that judicial discretion is inevitable but also
that in human rights adjudication it inevitably and habitually involves
contestable value judgments. Conceptual vagueness and contestability
also mean that rights are not obviously more justiciable than other human
values. It is unclear in what sense, if any, judicial decisions involving
human rights differ from political decisions involving trade-offs between
conflicting goods.
Case examples designed in particular to demonstrate in particular
the inadequate moral or rational basis for many judicial distinctions in
the exegesis of human are drawn largely from the European Convention
of Human Rights ("ECHR") and domestic British human rights cases.
The preponderance of some jurisdictions simply reflects the author's lack
of relative lack of familiarity with other jurisdictions. It does not follow
that the claims of this paper should therefore be confined to the
jurisdictions discussed. On the contrary, aspects of those jurisdictions
that are sources of uncertainty not applicable across human rights
jurisdictions and thus liable to distract from the discussion of the
uncertainty arising specifically from value pluralism and essential
contestability, such as the margin of appreciation under the ECHR, have
been deliberately excluded from the discussion so as not to restrict the
scope of its central claims unnecessarily.
4
4. It might be argued that the above claims are presented as more radical and
significant than they really are: rights, in common with other values, after the collapse of
religious consensus and a loss of faith in the possibility of a purely rational foundation of
ethics, clearly rest on certain normative assumptions; pluralism, as one such set of
assumptions, implies both that values might conflict and that there might not be optimal
answers to balancing conflicting values. This might apply to human rights, but, if so, it
also applies to other values. It might also be argued that most legal concepts are
essentially contested concepts, and human rights are not more so than other legal
concepts such as intention, negligence, responsibility, causality, or trusts. Finally, one
might add that most concepts, while having a core meaning, are contestable at the edges,
and that there is nothing exceptional about rights in this respect. The answer to these
objections is that, while they are valid in a limited sense, rights require a special
justification simply because, compared to other legal concepts, rights are given an
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II. Value Pluralism and the Normative Contestability of Rights
Modem conceptions of human rights have their origin in the idea of
natural rights. Central to the doctrine of natural rights is a combination
of a basic conception of equality with the idea of value monism: human
nature is essentially uniform; all human beings are held to share the same
ends that do not only determine moral rights and duties, but from which
some laws too derive their objectively valid authority. Natural rights, on
this view, essentially connote the enabling conditions for the attainment
of the moral ends shared by all human beings. For natural rights
theorists these rights are objective in as much as the ultimate human end
is objectively true and not in question. Since the human legal order must
not be contrary to men's final ends, a law which is contrary to natural
right is no law. It may be enforced, but it lacks legitimacy. Natural
rights theories thus imply both moral objectivism and value monism, that
is, the beliefs that moral values represent objective truths that do not
conflict, but are harmonious or at least hierarchically ordered. These
characteristics define natural rights theories in both their Christian and
secular variants.
For Aquinas, natural law linked eternal law with human law and
essentially ensured that positive law neither violated the divine order nor
conflicted with man's purpose within it. Hobbes, who was a determinist
and psychological egoist, grounded the roots of human nature and natural
rights in psychological empiricism. He argued that men have a natural
right and duty to do whatever is most likely to further their own self-
preservation. In civil society, natural rights survive in the right to rebel if
the individual is threatened by the ruler. John Locke was another
prominent modem Western philosopher who conceptualized rights as
natural and inalienable; he derived his triad of the natural rights to life,
liberty and property from a certain model of human nature as a
possessive individual.5  Finally Kant, who rejected Hobbes'
consequentialism and Locke's empiricism and is perhaps the purest
secular natural law theorist, likewise grounded natural rights, above all
the right to freedom of expression, in an ideal of a common human goal,
the shared end of autonomy. In all these cases natural rights function as
an objective and universal basis and minimum content of all positive law
elevated legal status. Even in Britain, Parliament cannot adopt legislation that would
abridge or abolish rights in the same way it could simply abolish trusts established for
avoiding inheritance tax. In relation to other values which face the same justificatory
dilemmas as rights, the fact remains that, for the most part, these values are not generally
justiciable, and, even when they are, they are so in a specific context and without the
overriding status accorded to rights.
5. See generally CRAWFORD B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF
POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
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and derive their authority from a model of human nature and its ends,
which are held equally objectively and universally true.
Modem conceptions of human rights share the equality and
universality assumption of natural law theorists but, generally speaking,
no longer rest on a monistic theory of human ends. This has created a
"legitimation crisis" for human rights. On the one hand, human rights
rest on a conception of human beings having certain universal rights
regardless of legal jurisdiction and irrespective of whether these rights
are recognised in positive law. While on the other hand, they lack a
secure moral basis in a metaphysical theory of human nature and its
purposes, which could sanction their authority. In its extreme form, the
scepticism about both religion and reason that has undermined the belief
in absolute truths leads to relativism. Relativism is ultimately
incompatible with any belief in human rights as anything more than a
diluted set of historically and culturally contingent dominant values in
certain places at certain times. However, a more accurate description of
the ethical position invoked or implied by most modem theories of
human rights is that of value pluralism.
The idea of value pluralism as a tragic conflict between
incommensurable values goes back at least to Max Weber, but it only
became an established concept in philosophical ethics through the work
of Isaiah Berlin. Central to Berlin's theory of value pluralism is his
rejection of monism, the belief that all ethical questions have an answer
and that these answers are both knowable and compatible with one
another. Value pluralism, by contrast, is the idea that there is not one set
of harmonious and coherent moral ends but several values which may be
equally correct and fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other. In
addition, value pluralism postulates that in many cases such incompatible
values may be incommensurable, in the sense that there is no common
measure, no "common currency" or master value that would allow
comparison between values (such as the principle of utility). Value
incommensurability connotes a breakdown or failure of transitivity. To
say that two values are incommensurable is to say that they cannot be the
subject of comparison. The mark of incommensurability among options
or values shows itself when "If it possible for one of them to be
improved without thereby becoming better than the other, and if there
can be another option which is better than the one, but not better than the
other, then the two original options are incommensurate."
6
It follows that where incommensurability among values discloses
itself, there is no general procedure for resolving value conflict. The
resolution of such conflict would require the possibility of comparison
6. See JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 50 (1995).
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and the existence of a common currency of value into which all values
could be translated according to fixed formula. In cases of conflict it
could then be established, at least theoretically, that the loss of so many
units of value X in return for a gain in so many units of Y would result in
a net gain or loss of (overall) value compared to any of the alternative
combinations of those two values. For Berlin, the incommensurability of
values prevents precisely this translation of different values into one
common denomination.
Berlin's value pluralism differs from skepticism, subjectivism, and
relativism in that it is a variant of objective moral realism which treats
values as well as the central idea of commensurability as true matters of
moral knowledge.7 Epistemologically, it is based, as Berlin puts it, on
"the world that we encounter in ordinary experience," in which "we are
faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally
absolute, the reali[z]ation of some of which must inevitably involve the
sacrifice of others.",8 Yet, although ultimately rooted in deep moral
intuitions, Berlin holds that the doctrine of pluralism reflects a necessary
truth about the nature of human moral life and the values that are its
ingredients. The idea of a perfect whole, the ultimate solution in which
values are combined in a quasi-Pareto optimal way so that there would
be no other combination of values that would create more value, is not
only unattainable in practice, but also conceptually incoherent. Berlin's
idea of value pluralism poses a threat to modem conceptions of human
rights at two levels: first, at the philosophical level where the
prioritization of any particular set of human values is still open to debate
and requires justification, and, second, at the level of adjudication which
concern human rights documents which enshrine lists of particular rights
which have been prioritized as a result of political rather than
philosophical choices and which also involve conflicts between
pluralistic values. The remainder of this section will focus on the first
issue, whilst section two will deal with the second. It will become clear
that both are interlinked.
Berlin gives many examples of conflicting values. Liberty can
conflict with equality or with public order; mercy with justice; love with
impartiality and fairness; social and moral commitment with the
disinterested pursuit of truth or beauty (indeed the latter two values,
contrary to Keats, may themselves be incompatible); knowledge with
happiness; spontaneity and free-spiritedness with dependability and
responsibility. Distinguishing between virtue and goods, which Berlin
7. Id. at 46-47, 49.
8. ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 213 (Henry
Hardy ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2002) (1969).
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fails to, do, in the hope of reducing the number of fixed stars on the
firmament of human values, or grant that not all the remaining values
necessarily conflict, does not invalidate Berlin's central assertion. Any
morality of complexity and development that is not out of step with basic
human moral experience and psychology recognizes values, which are by
nature not combinable. For example, the values of autonomous agency
and unreflective decency which are conceptually or logically incoherent
in the sense that a single person cannot at all times possess or exercise
both.9 Within any developed morality, conflicts will arise between
intrinsic values that do not only collide in practice, but which are
inherently rivalrous as the conflict between them cannot be resolved by
reference to any overarching standard.
Berlin, however, goes on to argue that each of these conflicting
values is itself internally complex and pluralistic, containing conflicting
elements. An example is the concept of liberty which, according to
Berlin divides into both positive and negative liberty.' 0 Moreover, the
concept of negative liberty itself, defined as the freedom to act
independent of external restraints, contains rivalrous and
incommensurable liberties. For example, the liberty of the press to probe
into people's private lives may limit individuals' freedom to do what
they like without fear of disapprobation or intrusion. The same is true of
equality which can be construed in terms of the incompatible and
incommensurable equalities of welfare and of resources," or of those of
income or of opportunity. Individual values are not harmonious wholes
but within themselves constitute arenas of conflict and
incommensurability. 12  Conflicts of values, thus, for Berlin are "an
intrinsic, irremovable part of human life"; the idea of total human
fulfillment is a chimera.' 
3
In a pluralist world of the kind outlined the legal priority accorded
9. Gray, supra note 6, at 45.
10. Negative liberty, put simply, consists in the absence of external impediments to
the agent's doing as he likes, while positive liberty requires rational self-realization
according to the agent is free only if he does what is rational or what he ought to do. On
the negative view, the agent is free if others do not prevent him from experimenting with
drugs and becoming addicted. In such a state, however, the agent is not free in the
positive sense. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF
MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 191 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds. 1997)
(describing classic exposition of distinction between negative and positive liberty).
11. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part II: Equality of
Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part I:
Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981).
12. Gray, supra note 6, at 43.
13. "These collisions of values are of the essence of what they are and what we are,"
The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND, supra note 10, at 11; a
world in which such conflicts are resolved is not the world we know or understand.
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to human rights can only be defended rationally if these rights relate to
those fundamental pluralistic values between which there is no
possibility of rational choice but which enjoy priority over other goods
either on the grounds that the latter are merely instrumental or that they
are inferior. Human rights therefore must either be rights to attain or
secure pluralistic values or goods or rights to those conditions that allow
for their attainment. The natural law philosophers all defended their
rights either as legal expressions of the requirements allowing for the
realization of human nature properly understood. This meant that natural
rights were either equated with certain cardinal values or goods or
defined in terms of the conditions that would allow individuals to live up
to them. Yet, if human rights are justifiable in terms of either being
preconditions for or equivalent to pluralistic values, then, from a
pluralistic perspective, this also poses a fatal problem. For if there is no
way of choosing between different fundamental values so that any choice
between them entails tragic loss and no choice is necessarily rationally
preferable, then the same must apply to instances of choice between the
rights derived from them, whether they are defined in terms of the
enabling conditions for these values or as practically identical with them.
Obvious examples referring to Berlin's above list of conflicting values
would be the following: equality, whether equated with equality of
opportunity, welfare or income, would sanction economic or social
rights, such as a right to a just wage independently of the market price,
that would be just as incompatible with the rights implied by the pursuit
of knowledge or artistic freedom as with those sanctioned by the market
demands of efficiency or innovation. These rights each express some
ultimate value itself or a fundamental corollary thereof; yet they are both
incompatible and incommensurable, and their incommensurability makes
it impossible to say how much of each right the best society would
contain or would give most value to individual lives. If there is no way
of choosing between or balancing between, then, for those reasons, there
cannot be a rational basis for prioritizing one set of rights, for example
the negative liberties of intellectual and economic freedom as the legal
guarantees favoring scientific advancement, artistic creativity and/or
economic efficiency and progress, over alternative economic rights
favoring the goal of equality or the satisfaction of basic needs. Choosing
the former favors one value and choosing the latter favors the other, but,
since there is no rational way of establishing the priority of either
underlying value, there is no rational basis for prioritizing one set of
rights over another. Contrary to much wishful thinking, rights cannot be
neutral, and there can be no higher-order rational or moral criteria in
trade-offs between rights which express or are essential to the
safeguarding or realization of rivalrous human ends.
2007]
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In general terms, if fundamental values can be incompatible and
incommensurable, so that there is no rational way of either choosing
between them or balancing their conflicting demands, then the same will
be true of rights. No set of rights derived from one value can, by appeal
to reason alone, be accorded priority over alternative sets derived from
other values if no such priority can be established in the relation between
the underlying values themselves. Consequently, if rights conflict, as
they often will, it is impossible to say by reference to a common standard
of value when, for example, a restriction in certain liberties such as the
freedom to provide private sector education or healthcare may be
outweighed by correlative gains in equality resulting from prioritizing
rights to universal public education and free healthcare. In short, if we
take value pluralism seriously, then if values are plural, so are rights.
And if no value always take priority over others, then neither can any
right or set of rights.' 4 We are faced with tragic choices where the
promotion of one value may diminish others, and where the recognition
and enforcement of one right or set of rights will inevitably be an
infraction of another. If such rights conflict, there is no method to
determine the perfect balance between them and hence no way of
prioritizing one over another, either generally or often even in particular
conflictual situations.
A good illustration of the pluralistic dilemma of the justification of
human rights is provided by the history of human rights theory itself and
the rights favored by the ECHR. It is common for human rights to be
divided into three generations of rights. The first generation are civil and
political rights, second generation rights refer to social and economic
rights and third generation rights are commonly understood to connote
miscellaneous collective rights such as minority rights, environmental or
other group rights.' 5 Focusing on the first two categories, there is an
undeniable conflict between civil and political rights on the one hand and
social and economic rights on the other, which in essence is an
expression of the underlying tension between the pluralistic values of
individual liberty and social justice or equality. The extent to which any
bill of rights favors one or the other is based on a value judgment or
choice for which there is no rational basis. To the extent it may include
both first and second generation rights and seek to compromise between
14. Except if that right could be shown to be an essential part or a precondition for
the achievement of all pluralistic values. Given the divergence between those values with
a credible claim to being ultimate values, this possibility does not merit serious
discussion.
15. See HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 136-320 (2000) (describing first two generations of
rights).
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them, any such compromise may likewise be incapable of rational
justification. The reason lies in the lack of transitivity between
pluralistic values which precludes their optimization.
International and national human rights charters generally protect
first generation rights together, in many cases, with specific protection
for the protection of minorities or asylum seekers. In addition, modem
human rights instruments also often refer to social and economic rights,
although usually in such vague terms so as the render these rights non-
justiciable. The ECHR is a prime example of a classic human rights
instrument confined largely to first generation civil and political rights.
As in relation to most other national and international bills of rights, the
first generation rights contained in the ECHR can be divided into several
broad sub-categories: first, rights protecting the integrity of the person,1
6
second, rights of due process or legality, 7 third, the freedoms of speech,
conscience, and religion which are at once civil rights and also safeguard
individual autonomy,' 8 and, finally, the right to respect for private and
family life and the bizarre right to found a family.' 9 Social and economic
rights are practically absent from the ECHR, for the right to non-
discrimination does not contain a general right to substantive equality,
but is confined to equal enjoyment of the other ECHR rights. 20 Even on
this briefest of all analyses, it is clear that, except for the rights protected
by ECHR Articles 2 to 4 protecting the integrity of the human person and
the minimal conditions of unimpeded agency, the ECHR unequivocally
favors civil and political rights over social and economic rights even to
the point where it comes close to treating children as the private property
of their parents by granting to latter the ECHR Article 12 right to
procreate even if they do not have the means. From the perspective of
value pluralism, the privileged legally indefeasible status assigned to
civil and individual liberties, but denied to the values of social justice or
minimum needs, lacks a normative basis and cannot be defended on
rational grounds. Unless one is prepared to endorse the premises that
individual liberty is a higher value than equality in any form, that
negative liberty generally trumps positive liberty and that the primacy of
individual liberty over other values goes so far as to ground a general
priority of negative liberties over social rights which is finds its
acknowledged limit only in the need for general protection of the
16. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms arts. 2-4, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S.
No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR].
17. Id. arts. 5-7, 13.
18. Id. arts. 9-11.
19. Id. arts. 8, 12.
20. Id. art. 14.
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minimum social and psychological conditions of individual agency, the
primacy assigned to civil and political rights is morally arbitrary.21 It is
so in every ethical pluriverse that acknowledges a dilemma in reconciling
competing values such as justice and liberty and would only cease to be
so if either one became a liberal monist or, as will be examined later, if it
could be shown that while social and economic values might be just as
valuable as individual liberties, they do not lend themselves to
enforcement by the courts.
III. Human Rights Adjudication Between Normative and Linguistic
Contestability
It might be objected that in practice international and national
human rights documents have resolved the pluralistic dilemma by
factually prioritizing certain values on which the human rights they
contain are based, even if that choice lacks a rational basis and is
ultimately political. Value pluralism may pose a threat to providing a
philosophical foundation for specific human rights but it is practically
irrelevant as some values have de facto triumphed over others in the
sense that they have found political and legal recognition in national and
international human rights documents, whilst others have not. A
distinction should therefore be drawn between two types of inquiry: the
search for a philosophical foundation for rights on the one hand, and, on
the other, the more limited attempt to bring coherence into human rights
language at the level of judicial practice and political reality. Where
legally enshrined rights clash, therefore, it might be argued, the conflicts
between them do not have to be settled at the deep philosophical level of
their underlying justifications but at the more accessible and more
tangible level of the wording of charter provisions and legal principles.
This view may be questioned for at least three reasons. First, the
problem of value pluralism remains relevant at the level of human rights
adjudication. Second, the concept of human rights itself is an essentially
contestable concept, and, third, many human rights either are or contain
such concepts, as are or do the limiting conditions defining the scope of
ECHR rights no less than the legal principles supposed to guide and
constrain judicial discretion in case of conflict between rights.
21. It is probably best explained in terms of the specific historical background
against which it was drafted and the reluctance of judges, even at national level let alone
at international level, to get embroiled in the controversies involved in making policy
decisions with budgetary implications. These, however, would inevitably flow from
placing courts in charge of enforcing rights to free healthcare, a minimum wage, adequate
pensions, or unemployment benefits.
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A. Value Pluralism and Human Rights Adjudication
Not only do some modem constitutions such as the German
constitution expressly mention certain basic values such as human
dignity which underlie the other constitutional rights, but, as Conor
Gearty David Feldman,23 and others have convincingly shown,
national and international human rights documents generally contain
rights that are clustered around a range of core values even if these
values are not expressly mentioned in those documents. These core
values tend to be human dignity including the right to life, procedural
justice (or the rule of law), and the ideal of democratic government.
Gearty mentions these three values, but some values in the ECHR and
other bills of rights do not appear to be justifiable on those grounds.
These include the rights to marry and to found a family, and above all the
right to privacy.24 A fourth core value may therefore be added, which is
individual or negative liberty. Together these four values provide a
justification for almost all the human rights contained in any national or
international charter although one might also wish to add equality as a
supplementary value--equality not in any substantive sense but as a
source for the principle of non-discrimination or equal enjoyment of
fundamental rights.25 Bills of rights and human rights conventions either
expressly affirm these values or, where they do not, the courts
nonetheless often invoke and refer to them as underlying values or
justificatory grounds for specific rights.
The Charter of the United Nations, for example, expressly affirms
the "dignity and worth of the human person," "the equal rights of men
22. See generally CONOR GEARTY, CAN HUMAN RIGHTS SURVIVE? (THE HAMLYN
LECTURES) 17-59 (2006); CONOR GEARTY, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
(2004).
23. DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
1-51 (2d ed. 2002).
24. See, e.g., id. at 524, 527, 518.
25. Another common way of classifying fundamental rights is the distinction
between civil liberties and human rights. Broadly speaking, civil liberties are those
which individuals enjoy by virtue of being citizens of a society, while human rights
proper refer to those rights derived from the principles of dignity and individual liberty.
Freedom of association seems clearly a civil liberty, while the rights to life or the
prohibition of torture are examples of rights based on human dignity. Some rights,
however, can be classified as falling into either category, e.g., freedom of expression, and
privacy for instance may be defended as grounded in human dignity on a liberal view of
society, but may also be conceived as possessing little intrinsic value as it does little more
than afford people the opportunity to do in private what they may not wish to admit to in
public. It also remains unclear if political rights, such as the rights to vote or stand for
office form a separate category or further examples of civil liberties. In general terms,
not much hinges on such qualification although they are useful in drawing attention to the
underlying justificatory ideas of human rights.
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and women" as "the foundation of freedom., 26  In the ECHR, the
signatory states refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
also refer to "fundamental freedoms," which "are best maintained... by
an effective political democracy. 27 Both charters also expressly affirm
several core values in their definition of particular rights. The same is
true of national constitutions. The German or South African
constitutions, for example, both mention "human dignity" together with
other core values.28 Such constitutions were inspired by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the ECHR, but likewise by some
highly influential early national declarations. Thus, there has clearly
been an international convergence in terms both of the content and
underlying principles of human rights instruments. The shared basis of
most human rights regimes is evidenced not merely by similarity in their
references to the same core values; even where those core values are not
mentioned in national bills of rights their near-universal importance is
underlined by the fact that the national courts have nevertheless tended to
refer to core values in human rights jurisprudence. 29 Value pluralism
therefore has not disappeared at the practical level of human rights
adjudication. It has simply been reduced to the plurality of four to five
ultimate core values that, depending on the circumstances, may be
harmonious, indifferent to, or in conflict with each other.
Where rights based on the core values conflict, the rivalrous rights
will thus either express different values or different aspects of the same
value. In either case, this conflict cannot be resolved by appeal to reason
for there is no clear hierarchy between the underlying values or between
different aspects of them. An example would be the potentially
conflicting demands between freedom of expression and the right to
privacy which may be presented as a straightforward clash between the
requirements of the core values of democracy and of individual liberty
or, alternatively, as a conflict between two different aspects of one
concept, namely, negative liberty sub-divided into the two negative
liberties of the freedom of expression as opposed to the liberty to conduct
one's life free from unwelcome publicity. Conflicts also exist between
the freedom of the press as a subset of freedom of expression and the
26. U.N. Charter pmbl.
27. ECHR, supra note 16, at pbml.
28. See GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] art. 1; S. AFR.
CONST. 1996 § 10.
29. Feldman provides a number of specific illustrations. The French Conseil
Constitutionnel, for example, has repeatedly treated human dignity as a fundamental
constitutional principle although it is not expressly mentioned in either the French
Declaration of Human Rights or the French Constitution. Feldman shows that the same
could even be said of the English Court of Appeal, which has not shrunk from relying on
the notion of human dignity in all but name. See FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 125-132.
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right to a fair trial, which precludes undue influence on the jury, e.g., by
a virulent press campaign, 30 between the right to life and the right to
abortion, which is often justified-somewhat debatably in terms of
ordinary usage of language-as a derivative of the right to privacy, or
perpetually between the rights to liberty, privacy, and fair trial with the
exigencies of public security and emergency. In all these cases, the
tensions between these rights are expressive of an underlying clash
between competing values, or conflicting aspects within a single value.
Philosophically such conflicts cannot be resolved if they occur between
the competing demands of ultimate values or different aspects of equal or
indeterminate rank within single values, and it follows that when rights
justified in these terms and given equal or indeterminate status, come
into conflict and judges have to adjudicate between their conflicting
claims, there is no rational basis for favoring one over the other or one
compromise solution over another. When a judicial choice is made in
such circumstances, it is made in the absence of rational justification and
"beyond good and evil."
31
The persistence of value pluralism at the level of human rights
adjudication poses a threat to the distinction between law making and
application of the law, which is at the heart of the notion of the rule of
law and the separate functions of legitimacy and legality. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that it is not commonly acknowledged that the
human rights jurisdiction of the courts is ill-defined and that judges
routinely engage in value judgments in balancing conflicting cardinal
values behind the legal veil of objectivist and value-neutral human rights
30. See, e.g., Wloch v. Poland, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Priebke v. Italy, No.
48799/99, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 5, 2001), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/
(French translation).
3 1. It is obvious that it does not follow from these or any of the above remarks that
one judicial decision will always be as good as another. Only those judicial decisions
that concern choices between equally ultimate, incompatible, and incommensurable
values are not capable of rational or ethical justification and then only by comparison to
other such decisions. There will always remain numerous judicial decisions which could
be described as rational or ethically sub-optimal in the sense that they reconcile values x
and y in a way that a greater amount could be realized of either value by an alternative
decision without any detriment to the other value. It is difficult, however, to establish
that one judicial decision will contain all the benefits in terms protecting one right also
offered by an alternative decision plus sacrifice less of the conflicting right than the
alternative. In such case, it could be argued that one judicial decision realized more value
than another and is therefore preferable because the outcomes are not incommensurable.
More typically, however, two alternative decisions will balance rights in ways that do not
clearly allow for such comparative assessments, which means the results will be
incommensurable provided both claims fall properly within the remit of the two or more
conflicting rights identified. Whether they do, however, is not an issue resulting from the
ethical indeterminacies of value pluralism but a question of conceptual certainty that is
the subject of the next section of this article.
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adjudication. Three propositions in particular may be advanced in
support of the view that, even in the absence of a clear normative
hierarchy of values, clear definitions of the limits and principles of
practical human rights adjudication may nonetheless be capable of
providing the legal certainty that could restrain arbitrary judicial
decision-making.
First, it may be argued that where human rights are constitutionally
or otherwise legally recognized, the question of their justification has
been given a definitive politico-legal answer. And where these legally
recognized rights clash, conflicts between them can be resolved by
reference to established legal principles which tell judges which right
takes priority under what circumstances. It is only where such principles
themselves conflict or cannot provide adequate guidance for other
reasons that the need for a justification for any given balancing act
between conflicting rights may require a foundational normative answer.
Some legal theorists, however most notably Dworkin, seem to suggest all
legal questions including all questions involving conflicts between rights
have one correct legal answer, and that, where strict legal rules run out,
the answer is always provided by the appropriate legal principles
properly understood and applied in the right spirit and order.32
Second, rights recognized in constitutions and conventions are
generally worded so as to provide for appropriate exceptions and
qualifications which take account of the conflicting demands of other
rights or considerations and thereby reduce the scope for conflict
between rights.33
Third, the possibility of clashes between rights is reduced even
further in practice because bills of rights generally either exclude or only
partially safeguard positive rights, that is, those rights requiring state
action beyond legal prohibitions to enable individuals to achieve certain
ends, nor do they generally endorse positive corollaries of negative
rights. The general emphasis in the ECHR, for example, on non-
interference with individual rights as distinct from the imposition of
duties to aid or assist the enjoyment of those rights, provides clear
guidance to the judiciary to construe rights negatively and not positively
32. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE: LEGAL THEORY (1986).
33. There are numerous examples. An obvious one is the protection of private
property in the ECHR or the German Basic Law that is qualified with reference to the
public interest. Another and perhaps more surprising instance of a heavily qualified right
is the right to life under ECHR Article 2, which for a long time was deemed compatible
with the death penalty and remains so for those countries that have not signed the
protocol abolishing the latter, and is subject to a whole array of other exceptions
concerned with public security and the enforcement of the criminal law. In fact, Article 2
is one of the most heavily qualified rights of the ECHR in contrast, for example, with the
unqualified prohibition of torture and degrading treatment under Article 3.
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even where the Convention text of itself may be deemed ambiguous.
In summary, therefore, if true these three propositions would
warrant the conclusion that hard cases resulting from pluralistic value
conflicts have no or little practical significance at the practical level of
legally recognized rights because conflicts between them can be settled
without recourse to foundationalist language and reasoning.
Unfortunately, however, none of the above claims which may be
advanced to consign pluralism to the outer reaches of metaphysics are
convincing. The discussion in the remainder of this paper is not
structured around these three propositions. However, by considering the
linguistic sources of uncertainty common to them, the resultant
conclusions will indirectly provide the answers to those claims on which
the tenability of the legal certainty as distinct from a more
foundationalist normative defense of human rights adjudication
ultimately rests. It will become clear that legal rights frequently conflict
as a matter of judicial practice as judges disagree about the ways in
which they should be balanced. There are compelling theoretical or
methodological reasons for the persistence of vagueness, judicial
discretion, and the need for basic value judgments at the level of judicial
practice. They arise above all from the dual effects of value pluralism
and the essential contestability of many legal and ethical concepts
including the concept of human rights itself as well as the concepts
underlying many individual rights. In the context of the ECHR and its
application by the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") and
national courts their dual effect creates conceptual uncertainty (in
addition to value conflict) in at least four respects: the essential
contestability of (1) the concept of human rights itself, (2) the concepts
underlying many individual rights, (3) the concepts defining the
limitations and qualifications commonly imposed on human rights, and
(4) the legal principles designed to govern the application of rights or to
balance their conflicting requirements. Before dealing with these,
however, it is necessary briefly to outline the notion of essentially
contested concepts.
B. The Idea of Essentially Contested Concepts
In a well-known article, the philosopher Walter B. Gallie argued
that there are concepts that are essentially contested; concepts the proper
use of which inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses
on the part of their users.34 For Gallie, a concept is essentially
34. Walter B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y
167 (1955-56).
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contestable if it is impossible by means of rational-logical argument to
resolve disagreements about its meaning and that whatever meaning is
attached to it is contingent on substantive normative assumptions. He
lists seven conditions a concept must fulfil to be essentially contested.
Some of these partially restate one another, others are unclear and some
are disputed by commentators.35 I shall focus on the first three and later
add a fourth condition:
(1) The concept must be evaluative or "appraisive": it must indicate
or signify something that is valuable, good, right, worthy, and so on.
(2) The nature of the concept must be complex, so that different
aspects of it can be stressed.
(3) It is not manifest why the achievement of the condition signified
by the complex concept is good, right, worthy, and so on; its
goodness or rightness can be explained in different ways, depending
on one's view of the complex.
On this basis, a concept is essentially contested when it is appraisive
in that the state of affairs it describes is a valued achievement which is
variously describable and internally complex in that its characterization
involves reference to several aspects or dimensions without any criteria
of application which determine the order and weight of these multiple
aspects or dimensions.36
Gallie explains his idea of an essentially contested concept ("ECC")
through the example of championship. In contrast with familiar annual
competitions where the rules for the selection of "the champion" are
clear, Gallie suggests the following unusual scenario: The championship
is not awarded according to some settled and agreed-upon body of rules,
but rather in virtue of the style and level of play. Everyone agrees,
though, that the champion is the team that "plays the best." There is no
fixed point at which a team becomes the champion, nor does it retain the
title for a fixed period. The competition has no official judges, and there
are no well settled or generally accepted rules for the designation of the
champion. Each side has its supporters who insist that is the "true" or
"real" champion on the grounds that it "plays the game best." Each team
stresses some aspect of the game-speed, power, elegance, or strategy-
and is supported by its fans who insist that this is the truly crucial aspect
35. See John Gray, On Liberty, Liberalism and Essential Contestability, 8 BRIT. J.
POL. Sci. 385, 390 (1978).
36. The definition is the author's, but it partly draws on that provided by William
Connolly in The Terms of Political Discourse. See WILLIAM CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 9-14 (1974).
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of the game. So each side sees its team as the best because it expresses
that part of the game that, they claim, is the most important. Gallic's
point, of course, is that such a competition would be characterised by
constant, intractable disputes about who is the champion. Indeed, it
seems in principle impossible to resolve the dispute, for it seems
impossible to show what aspect of the game is truly the most important
and which team is truly the champion. In this sense, the championship is
essentially contested.
One way to understand Gallic's point is to distinguish between a
concept and various conceptions of it. Each of the competing
interpretations of the concept is a conception of it. Each conception has
at least some of the characteristics associated with the core-the concept.
To show that the various conceptions really represent disagreement about
a common concept and not different concepts themselves, Gallic adds a
further condition, namely, that the parties agree on a common
"exemplar"-a sort of perfect case-that embodies all the important
features of the concept.37 This appears mistaken. There need not be a
common core which is shared by all the uses of a concept. A better
analogy is that of Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblances: A
conception identifies some parts of the cluster as features commonly
found in conceptions of the concept, while insisting that other elements
are less important and some perhaps irrelevant. Not all the cluster
features, however, must be present in all conceptions of the concept.38
The Hapsburg lip is an example of such a family resemblance: while not
present in every family member, it was a recurring and common feature
amongst the Hapsburgs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The idea of concepts that are essentially contestable is conceptually
distinct from that of value pluralism; although, many values are also
ECCs. Moreover, where values are ECCs, the competing conceptions of
the underlying concepts may sometimes relate to one another in a fashion
analogous to value pluralism. An example would be the ECC of
liberty-two of its conceptions, negative and positive freedom, may also
be conceived as pluralistic values in their own right. It is therefore not
surprising that in their effect value pluralism and ECCs often reinforce
each other. That effect is not confined to the philosophical justifiability
of human rights, but gives rise to uncertainty and the need for value
judgments in human rights adjudication.
37. Gallie, supra note 34, at 180.
38. LUDWIG WITTGENSTE1N, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § § 66-71 (1953).
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C. The Essential Contestability of the Concept of Human Rights
It is common for political and legal theorists to distinguish between
the good and the right. A good, put simply, is either a value or a
desideratum that may be ultimate or instrumental. A right is a good that
takes priority over other goods where it is given a special privileged legal
status. The range of human goods is famously contested, as is the
possibility of the summum bonum or the supreme good. Finally, many
goods are essentially contested concepts. Examples include justice,
liberty, equality, dignity, and even happiness. Further instances include
political goods, such as liberalism or democracy.
If human rights enjoy priority over other goods, then the selection of
rights as a subset of privileged goods requires a special contestable
justification, as there is no settled, agreed, or demonstrably rational way
of adjudicating between competing goods except with reference to some
supreme value, the status of which is open to question. This is the
dilemma of value pluralism. It entails the incommensurability of rights
no less than that of goods and the absence of objective, rational criteria
for resolving clashes between them.
Specific human rights, however, are not only normatively contested,
the concept of human rights itself is also essentially contestable. In
terms of Gallie's conditions, the concept of human rights clearly
connotes something valuable; it is internally complex in that its meaning
represents a cluster of different aspects or attributes, not all of which are
compatible, that are not subject to any shared hierarchical order or
criteria of application. In large measure, the conceptual uncertainty of
the idea of human rights merely reflects competing theories of the nature
of rights. One important distinction is between the will and interest
theories of rights.
The will theory, propagated by Herbert L.A. Hart,39 identifies the
right-bearer by virtue of the power that he has over any corresponding
duty. He can waive it, extinguish it, enforce it or leave it unenforced; the
decision is his choice. Individual discretion is the distinctive feature of
this concept of rights. Rights, in this view, may therefore also be called
liberties. By contrast, the interest theory, which is espoused by Neil
MacCormick, Joseph Raz, and others,40 argues that the purpose of rights
is not to protect individual assertion but certain interests. The interest
theory enables one to talk of rights in advance of determining exactly
39. HERBERT L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL
THEORY chap. vii (1982); Herbert L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL.
REv. 175 (1995).
40. See LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 355 (Michael D. A. Freeman ed.,
7th ed., 2001).
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who has the duty. It may therefore cover all types of rights including so-
called socio-economic rights, such as those to health care, education,
minimum income, etc. Wesley N. Hohfeld, in his famous typology of
rights, draws another distinction between rights stricto sensu and
liberties, which he also calls privileges. Hohfeld distinguishes further
usages of the term "right" that are irrelevant to human rights.4 1 The
important point is that the concept of right is used ambiguously. On the
will view, rights are waivable; on the interest view they are not. The
former clearly assumes that the rights-bearer must be an autonomous
agent, while the latter can accommodate interests of those who may not
be relied upon acting in their own best self-interest. Finally, while the
latter conceives of rights as being concerned with promoting the good,
the former views them as merely removing various obstacles that might
prevent individuals from promoting or willing the good. Other attributes,
however, are shared by rights on both views: they are individualistic,
equal, universal or universalizable; they may also be either negative or
positive, or procedural or substantive. Yet, not even the attributes shared
by both theories are uncontested. Human rights documents generally
show a bias towards negative rights; on some views, human rights should
be solely or mainly procedural. Finally, certain third generation rights,
such as minority or environmental rights, conceive of rights not
necessarily as universal and equal, but as the properties of certain groups
or minorities or even of those not yet alive and who may never be born.
There is no settled criterion for deciding which of these attributes are
essential, more important, or correct, for there is no universally shared or
correct definition of the concept of human rights in the sense that there is
no agreement as to the range of necessary and optional attributes of the
concept. Further, there is no coherent conception of human rights that
synthesises those features attributed to it by common usage in a
demonstrably more coherent or rational manner than rivalrous
conceptions. In that sense, the concept of human rights can be said to be
essentially contestable.
In practice, the indeterminacy of the concept of rights has been
overcome to some extent by a general judicial approach favoring the
negative over the positive construction of human rights. Yet, just as
human rights documents do not follow a uniform, coherent conception of
what is common to the concept of human rights across the spectrum of
individual rights, judicial attitudes have not been consistent. Indeed,
both the Strasbourg and the British judiciary have shown a markedly
greater willingness to impose positive obligations under ECHR Article 8,
41. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, in LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 40, at 510.
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even where the imposition of more extensive obligations for the
protection of privacy seems far from obvious when comparing the text of
ECHR Article 8 with other provisions.42
In Von Hannover v. Germany,43 the ECtHR held that, by adopting
too narrow a conception of privacy in public places, the German courts
failed in their positive duty to protect the applicant's right to private life.
This "Hanoverian" approach by the ECtHR has been taken to extremes
by the English courts under the Human Rights Act 1998 ("HRA"), which
makes the ECHR directly enforceable in British courts, but also
generally restricts litigation of ECHR rights to cases against public
authorities. In Douglas v. Hello! Ltd.,44 two film actor claimants entered
into an exclusive publication deal with a magazine, which effectively
converted photographs of the actors' wedding from essentially private
material into commercial and publicly available material. The English
Court of Appeal upheld an earlier finding of a breach of the claimants'
right to privacy when another national magazine published unauthorized
photographs, thereby extending the concept of privacy to the right to the
economic interest attached to waiving that privacy.
The Court of Appeal's decision in Douglas is remarkable in two
respects. First, it impliedly asserts a will-based conception of privacy as
an essentially alienable right. This is in sharp contrast to the more
commonly held view in relation to most other human rights, which are
inalienable and more than a commercial interest. Secondly, what is
astonishing in the Douglas case as well as the ruling in Campbell v.
MGNLtd.,4 where the House of Lords reached a similar conclusions that
is more defensible on the facts, is the apparent ease with which the courts
apply and extend Lord Chief Justice Woolf's decision in A v. B Plc.46 to
42. For more detailed discussion and examples, see FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 54.
43. Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 294.
44. Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, [2006] 1 Q.B. 125.
45. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
46. A v. B Plc., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 337, [2003] Q.B. 195 (2002). The court held
that
[Articles 8 and 10] have provided new parameters within which the court will
decide, in an action for breach of confidence, whether a person is entitled to
have his privacy protected by the court or whether the restriction of freedom of
expression which such protection involves cannot be justified. The court's
approach to the issues which the applications raise has been modified because,
under section 6 of the [HRA], the court, as a public authority, is required not to
act "in a way which is incompatible with a [ECHR] right." The court is able to
achieve this by absorbing the rights which articles 8 and 10 protect into the
long-established action for breach of confidence. This involves giving a new
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use their powers as public authorities under section 6 of the HRA to
ensure compliance with the ECHR in horizontal litigation involving
private parties, when such litigation involves privacy claims by those
whose economic fortunes largely seem to rest on their celebrity status.
In these cases, the English courts have used that discretion to protect the
indigenous law of defamation and even consolidate the law of
confidentiality over and above the demands of freedom of expression,
when the incorporation of the latter ECHR right into English law as part
of the HRA might have been expected to have exactly the opposite
effect.
Further, more obviously convincing examples where the ECtHR
found ECHR Article 8 to carry with it positive obligations include its
decisions holding that appropriate state bodies may have a duty to use
environmental and planning law to control polluters whose activities
make it difficult or unhealthy for people to live in affected areas, or to
provide information about environmental hazards.47  More
controversially, the ECtHR has also used ECHR Article 8 to establish
positive obligations to recognize the rights of transsexuals. In . v.
United Kingdom48 and Goodwin v. United Kingdom,49 the court found a
breach of ECHR Article 8 where the State had not legally recognised a
sex change, noting in particular that it was a relevant factor that the
surgery had been provided by the state. The court's expansive approach
under ECHR Article 8 can be contrasted with its generally restrictive
approach favoring negative rights and its pronounced resistance to
imposing positive obligations under other ECHR articles. For example,
except in highly restricted circumstances, the court has repeatedly
rejected claims that failure to grant legal aid in circumstances where
applicants had no other realistic means of funding litigation amounted to
a breach of the right to access to a court under ECHR Article 6.50
In those less numerous cases that did not involve ECHR Article 8,
but in which the ECtHR has nonetheless favored a positive rights
interpretation, the reasoning behind its decisions has generally been
logically more compelling. For instance, the ECtHR has interpreted
ECHR Article 11 as implying an obligation on the state to take
appropriate steps to ensure that counter-demonstrators do not make it
47. See FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 54 (providing detailed discussion of ECtHR
"environmental legislation" under ECHR Article 8).
48. I. v. United Kingdom, [2003] 36 E.H.R.R. 53 (2002).
49. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 483.
50. The court's reluctance to impose a public duty to fund civil litigation can of
course be explained in terms of the general judicial reluctance to pass judgments with far-
reaching budgetary implications; yet, this cannot detract from the fact that the courts
seem to hover between negative and positive interpretations of rights almost at will and
sometimes, admittedly, influenced by expediency.
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impossible for demonstrators to assemble and protest peacefully. The
court's reasoning can be summarised as follows: once a right has been
established, it must not be negatived by other persons having an
analogous right to do the same.
The court's asymmetrical approach to the acceptance of positive
dimensions of negative rights, however, is exemplified by its steadfast
avoidance of delivering a definitive ruling on the issue of abortion, which
it has generally preferred to be determined by domestic law. The Irish
Constitution grants a right to life to the unborn child subject to the equal
right of the mother. Although this clarifies or at least attempts to
delineate the exceptional nature of the circumstances in which an
abortion might be permissible under Irish law, the ECtHR nonetheless
held that Ireland's censoring of information about abortion services
violated the right to freedom of information and ideas under ECHR
Article 10.51 While the court's refusal to give a definitive ruling on the
issue of abortion might be justifiable under the ECHR's margin of
appreciation, its ruling against the Irish government on this occasion is
clearly unconvincing, as it appears to deny the Irish government at least
some of the means of enforcing its own legitimate public policy goals,
which are expressly recognized as appropriate qualifications under
ECHR Article 10. Ultimately, the Irish case is merely an illustration of
the well-ingrained differential treatment by the judiciary of the rights to
privacy and freedom of expression under ECHR Articles 8 and 10.
Although the Strasbourg Court has held that lack of impartiality in
reporting in public broadcasting or television channels may be in breach
of ECHR Article 10,52 it has consistently refused to extend that reasoning
to impose a positive regulatory duty on public bodies to protect plurality
of political opinion in the press and media against growing concentration
of media power in private hands. Methodologically, this approach is
unconvincing. If freedom of expression is a pillar of the political culture
and debate underpinning an effectively functioning liberal democracy,
then there is an equal justification for media regulation to prevent
concentration with its attendant danger of abuse of media power and
individual debasement as there is to watch over government interference
with public broadcasting and to protect journalistic freedom. The court's
steadfast reluctance to establish a regulatory duty on the basis of ECHR
Article 10 has been in stark contrast to the more expansive approach to
ECHR Article 8.
51. See Open Door v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1992).
52. See CHRISTIAN WALTER, GESCHICHTE UND ENTWICKLUNG DER EUROPAISCHE
GRUNDRECHTE uND GRUNDFREIHEITEN [HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND BASIC LIBERTIES] 102 (Dirk Ehlers ed., 2d ed., 2005).
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In summary, to the extent to which legal instruments may be said
generally to favor negative over positive rights formulations, they have
patently failed in restraining courts from extending positive duties to
some rights as distinct from others. There are two principal reasons that
have favored the persistence of broad judicial discretion in this regard.
First, in the absence of shared agreement on a fixed set of core attributes
definitive of the concept of human rights, there is no means of
demonstrating the validity of one conception of human rights over
another. Conceptual indeterminacy, however, favours judicial discretion.
Secondly, judicial discretion is amplified by the basic logical point that,
in the absence of a clear definition of particular rights and their scope,
those normative reasons justifying non-interference with a particular
right will often likewise justify additional positive measures to further
those rights. While conceptual indeterminacy of the idea of human rights
allows the courts, almost at will, to determine when to interpret rights
negatively or more positively, the irreducibility to negative or positive
interpretations of many arguments justifying individual rights ensures
that whichever interpretation the courts may favor initially, they remain
at liberty both either to expand their interpretation of individual rights
with reference to the same reasons that existed for recognizing the right
in the first place, or narrow that initial interpretation with reference either
to the equally elastic moral reasons supporting conflicting rights or
legitimate public policy goals. Courts, it seems, are entirely at liberty to
impose positive duties with respect to some rights but not to others, free
from the need for consistency or even its underdeveloped twin-
reasoning by analogy-and subject only to the one condition on which
all judicial discretion ultimately depends: sufficient political sensitivity
not to challenge a popular government over an issue of fundamental
public interest where the courts would be out of, and the government in
tune with, the public mood.
*D. The Essential Contestability of the Concepts Underlying Human
Rights
Charters of rights, it has been demonstrated, are not neutral, but
privilege certain claims over others, and generally elevate individual
autonomy and liberty over competing values, such as social justice, and
privilege the political ideal of liberal representative democracy over
other political values. The ECHR is a prime example of a human rights
document with a pronounced liberal, individualistic bias although it
shares that characteristic with most international covenants and national
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bills of rights.53 It has been shown that the political settlement favoring
these values among the wider range of pluralistic goods cannot overcome
the pluralistic dilemma of incommensurability between conflicting
values. It has also been shown that the concept of human rights as the
foundation for favoring some, or some aspects, of those values over
others is essentially contestable in that disagreements about its meaning
and between rivalrous conceptions of it, each respectively emphasising
certain aspects over and above others, cannot be settled by rational-
logical argument.
However, not only is the concept of human rights essentially
contestable, but so are many of the constituent concepts of many
individual rights as well as the basic value concepts underlying the most
widely recognized human rights. This creates a dual source of vagueness
and uncertainty in judicial interpretations of individual rights, which is
best illustrated by reference to the concepts concerned.
First, among the rights in the ECHR, but likewise those contained in
most other human rights documents, the right to life and the prohibitions
of torture, slavery, or arbitrary arrest (as well as the rights to private and
family life, freedom of expression, or found a family) are based on a
certain ideal of individual dignity or at least individual autonomy or
liberty. While the core meaning of concepts such as life and torture may
be clear, there will always be a penumbra of uncertainty in marginal
cases. 54 In penumbral cases, judges seek to justify their decisions by
reference to the values underlying individual rights. Individual dignity is
such a value, and it is also an essentially contestable concept. The
concept of dignity cannot furnish practical ethical, political, or legal
prescriptions except in the context of a particular model of human nature
and its ends. Which aspect of the multifarious concept of dignity is
emphasized at the expense of others inevitably depends on the model of
human nature adopted and also determines the nature and scope of the
rights that can be grounded in dignity. While dignity is generally readily
granted to all human beings in possession of the ordinary human
faculties including, with qualifications, children, the concept becomes
contestable at both the dawn and the end of human life. Birth in
particular seems to make "all the difference," as a protracted and ongoing
53. In broad terms it could be said that the U.S. Constitution is at the libertarian end
of the spectrum and the German, Canadian, or French constitutions at a slightly more
social-democratic end where the general emphasis on negative liberties and political
rights has been moderated to a degree by reference to social justice, the public interest,
or, in the Canadian case, to the increasingly fashionable group rights.
54. The metaphor of the core and penumbra was popularised by Hart, see HERBERT
L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (2d ed. 1994), although Glanville Williams
presaged Hart's claim that the judge has a law-making role in penumbral cases. See
Glanville Williams, Law and Language-Ill, 61 L.Q. REv. 179 (1945).
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judicial battle has been fought in most jurisdictions over the issue of
whether, and if so, to what extent a human fetus enjoys a right to life.
The answers reached invariably reflect conflicting visions of what it
means to have human personality and the requisite attributes to acquire
the indefeasible quality of human dignity, but the existence of
disagreements is an expression not only of conflicting values, but also of
the ineliminable vagueness of the concept of dignity.
A second set of ECHR rights comprises the civil freedoms of
association, religion, and expression, 55 the rights to private and family
life,56 and the sui generis right to found a family,57 which all revolve
around the ideals of individual autonomy or liberty.58 Liberty, of course,
in its two intuitively equally compelling but conflicting variants of
positive and negative liberty, is an archetypal ECC: a drug addict is not
free in the negative sense if somebody prevents him from administering
his drug dose, but that does not make him free in the positive sense not to
take the drug. Autonomy is essentially open to contestability for the
same reason: it can be equated with rational self-government or merely
with consent. Rational self-government assumes that there is a
demonstrably rational stance, and a person is autonomous only if he
embraces it. By contrast, consent is not concerned with rationality, but
solely with whether or not the agent has agreed to something. 59
55. ECHR, supra note 16, arts. 9-11.
56. Id. art. 8.
57. Id. art. 12.
58. However, on certain models of human nature, they may also be justified by
reference to a particular conception of dignity.
59. Consent, however, can be broken down further into conflicting conceptions.
Consent is of particular importance in medical cases as the basis of the adult's right to
accept or refuse treatment. The question is whether consent needs to be fully informed or
merely express. The English courts have exploited the vagueness of the concepts of
privacy and consent for the benefit of the medical profession and with very little regard
for consistency. First, the English courts have generally been reluctant to extend human
rights concepts to standards of medical care and to frame the relevant rules as an aspect
of the law of professional negligence rather than patients' rights. Given the expansive
approach adopted by the English courts to the interpretation of the concept of privacy in
other areas, this appears as an instance of judicial deference and a sub-species of judicial
discretion that appears difficult to justify. Instead of demanding fully informed consent,
the refusal to treat consent as a right and as part of the law of negligence has enabled the
courts to construe the law as protecting doctors against liability where (a) the patient is
capable of understanding the implications of the consent and (b) the doctor has given as
much information as a body of respectable medical opinion would consider reasonable.
See Sidaway v. Bd. of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985] A.C. 871 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.). Secondly, the vagueness of the concept of consent in the
absence of a clear legal definition has effectively allowed the courts to reach opposite
conclusions in analogous situations. In Regina v. Richardson (Diane), [1999] Q.B. 444
(1988), patients were treated by a dentist who, unknown to them, had been suspended
from practice. It is hard to believe that patients would have consented to treatment had
they known of the suspension, but the Court of Appeal held that the dentist had not acted
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The ECHR mentions a right to liberty,60 but that right is confined, in
general terms, to freedom from detention. Most cases involving
restrictions of individual liberty or autonomy have been litigated under
ECHR Article 8, protecting the right to privacy. Like the concept of
liberty, that of privacy lacks an agreed set of necessary and sufficient
attributes. In Hannover v. Germany,6 1 the ECtHR adopted a broad
conception of privacy, encompassing intrusions into a person's life that
take place in public when such interference does not concern an "issue of
general interest." 62  In the subsequent English case of Howlett v.
Holding,63 the English judge, who took cognisance of the Strasbourg
case law and acknowledged the authority of the broad privacy test laid
down in Hannover, nevertheless applied a simple test based on the
distinction between conduct that takes place in public and intrusions into
conduct in the private home. Leaving aside the misinterpretation of the
Strasbourg authority by the English judge, the important point in this
context is that each definition of the term "private"-its simple equation
with the private home no less than the broader "private sphere of action"
approach of the ECtHR-captures distinct, conflicting, and yet equally
without consent and was consequently not guilty of assault or breach of the patients'
rights. Consent could be vitiated by a mistake as to the identity of the person carrying out
the procedure, or as to the nature and quality of the procedure. The patients, however,
had known the identity of the dentist. A mistake as to her qualifications did not vitiate
that consent. By contrast, in R. v. Tabassum, [2000] 2 Crim. App. 328, the defendant had
offered breast treatment to several women, holding himself out as a cancer specialist, and
to be conducting a study of breast cancer. In reality, he had no relevant qualifications.
Some of the women knew him as a lecturer for a computer course in which they were
enrolled. All the women concerned had completed consent forms allowing him to
examine their breasts. They later said they would not have let him examine them had
they known that he was unqualified. He was convicted of indecent assault. His defense
of consent and appeal were rejected. The Court of Appeal decided that the women had
consented to the nature of his acts, but not to their quality, and had done so assuming he
had the purported qualifications. In the light of Regina v. Richardson (Diane), it is hard
to see why his lack of qualifications or speculation as to his motives should have negated
consent that was real, albeit not fully informed.
60. ECHR, supra note 16, art. 5.
61. See Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-Vt Eur. Ct. H.R. 294.
62. The ECtHR reasoned that the German courts had erred in particular in its
decision that the ECHR right to privacy could only come into play in circumstances
where the applicant found herself in a secluded place out of the public eye to which
persons retire "with the objectively recognisable aim of being alone and where, confident
of being alone, they behave in a manner in which they would not behave in public." Id.
54. Rejecting the "recogni[z]able aim of being alone" test, the ECtHR decided instead
that the decisive factor in balancing the protection of private life against freedom of
expression lay in the contribution that the published photos and articles could make to a
debate of general interest. On the facts of the case, the court held that the photos made no
such contribution as the applicant did not exercise any official function and as the
publication related solely to her private life. Id.
63. Howlett v. Holding, [2006] EWHC (QB) 41.
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valid conceptions of the concept of privacy-a classic case of an EEC.
At one level, the emergence and persistence of multiple privacy
tests, of course, reflects the fact that the ECtHR has deliberately avoided
defining the concept of privacy so as to be able to widen its application
not only to many situations more appropriately described as involving
the exercise of individual liberty, but also extend it to the workplace and
even encompass conduct in public where not of general interest. 64 At a
basic level, however, the inconsistency and ambiguity in the court's
jurisprudence may be viewed as an expression of the conceptual
indeterminacy surrounding the concept of privacy. Privacy does not
simply mean secrecy or protection against surveillance by others, which
would be of little value if the individual, while being protected against
publicity, remained constrained and without individual freedom. The
worth of privacy, therefore, presupposes the liberty to do as one pleases
subject to certain legal restraints such as respect for the privacy of others.
Hence, liberty is partly synonymous with self-determination, and so it
may be argued that ECHR Article 8 protects the individual's private
sphere of self-determination free from public scrutiny. This conception
of privacy was applied by the ECtHR in Van Kuck v. Germany,65 where
it posited a right to self-determination and extended it to issues involved
in sex change surgery. It is not obvious, however, what, if anything, the
issues of public recognition and reimbursement of medical expenses
have to do with the right to privacy. Yet, the case is good example of
how conceptual uncertainty arising from initial recognition of the
interconnectedness of two concepts, e.g., those of privacy and self-
determination, can be used to extend rights into politically fashionable
but rationally and ethically questionable territory. Respect for private
life then quickly ceases to be a mere matter of protecting people from
embarrassment by external scrutiny of their personal lives-the natural
meaning of the term "privacy"-and comes to involve respect for the
individual's personality, recognition, and sense of being valued. This is
not part of the obvious meaning of the term privacy, but part and parcel
of the judicial usage of the term, or, at least, it is so when it is expedient.
The catch-all use of the concept of privacy by the judiciary has been
particularly evident in the area of sexual freedom. In 1981, the ECtHR
held in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom66 that the blanket criminalization of
homosexual acts violated homosexuals' right to privacy. That case
concerned the law in Northern Ireland, although the court reached the
same conclusion in relation to an analogous ban in the Republic of
64. For more detailed discussion, see WALTER, supra note 52, at 64-65.
65. Van Kck v. Germany, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 73.
66. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149 (1981).
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Ireland67 and in another case involving Cyprus.68 Nowhere in Europe,
however, did the courts stretch the concept of privacy as systematically
and radically beyond its ordinary meaning as in the United States. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,69 the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut
anti-contraceptive statute on the grounds that, by impinging on "an
intimate relation of husband and wife,"7 ° the statute violated "a right of
privacy older than the Bill or Rights." 71 Two years later in Loving v.
72Virginia, the Court struck down Virginia's law banning interracial
marriages again on the basis of the allegedly time-honoured right to
privacy that is not even part of the Constitution. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,73
the Court struck down a state statute confining distribution of
contraceptive devices to married people. According to Justice Brennan:
"If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child., 74 The judicial stage was thus well set for the
Court's final extension of privacy into the realm of sexual self-
determination in Roe v. Wade.75 It seems that like the sea-encrusted
statue of Glaucon which, ravaged by time, ceased to bear any
resemblance to its original, the legal meaning of the term "privacy" no
longer bears any meaningful relationship to the ordinary meaning of the
word.
Finally, there remain some ECHR rights that, broadly speaking,
derive their justification from the normative foundations of the rule of
law and democracy. These are the rights of procedural justice in ECHR
Articles 5 to 7 and the civil freedoms of ECHR Articles 9 to 11, which,
as instances of individual liberties, nevertheless are crucial to a
democratic political culture. Democracy is rarely questioned as a
67. See Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 186 (1988).
68. See Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 485 (1993).
69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. Id. at 482.
71. Id. at 486.
72. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
73. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
74. Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court has been a well-known
agent of social change outside the sphere of social justice in the sixties and seventies. It
would be mistaken, however, to think the judicial activism was confined to the Federal
judicatore. An extreme example of judicial defiance of linguistic convention by senior
state court can be found in the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court
of New Jersey in the case of M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. 1976). In MT. v. J.T, the
court ruled that official recognition of a person's reassigned sex would "promote the
individual's quest for inner peace and personal happiness, while in no way disserving any
societal interest, principle of public order or precept of morality," id. at 211, all that under
the name of the individual's privacy.
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political value, but it is a complex concept the different aspects of which
have requirements that do not necessarily pull in the same direction. The
following are all part of the cluster of attributes central to the concept of
democracy: majority rule, effective accountability by the governors to
the governed, a viable and vibrant political culture supported by
recognizable demos (a people regarding itself as one), freedom of
expression, and, on some views, pluralism and toleration. It is a matter
of endless dispute which of these concepts, or which order, represents the
right conception of democracy.
The courts do not generally expressly discuss, let alone get drawn
into, defining notions of democracy and officially prefer to defer to the
executive where possible. In reality, however, many judicial trade-offs
between conflicting rights involve judgments about the meaning,
legitimate limits, and security requirements of democratic government.
76
The same can be said in relation to many other judicial decisions
involving references to the "general interest," the "public interest," or
"public policy," such as the "debate of general interest" criterion adopted
by the ECtHR in Hannover to balance the conflicting demands of
privacy and freedom of expression. The court here clearly assumed a
certain "restrained" variant of democracy, which implies the
controversial "private public sphere" distinction the court has sought to
establish without giving adequate consideration to the creeping
regulatory effect of restraints on free speech.
Similarly, the meaning of the concepts of the rule of law and
procedural justice are inseparable from the notions of non-
retrospectivity, certainty, equality before the law, between the parties,
and arguably of access to the law, effective law enforcement, and
extensive procedural safeguards. Any combination and hierarchical
ordering between those aspects may be claimed to be the correct
conception of the rule of law, or, conversely, none of these can be
definitely ruled out as irrelevant and few, if any, of the various orderings
of these concepts can be conclusively dismissed as irrational.
All this shows that where a right either amounts to an EEC or is
justified in terms of such a concept, its meaning cannot be settled by
appeal to rational-logical arguments; it is essentially indeterminable. Its
76. In Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, [2000] 29 E.H.R.R. 548 (1999), for
example, the ECtHR held that "the hallmarks" of a democratic society include
"pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness." Id. at 549. None of these attributes can be
said to be incontrovertible attributes of the core meaning of democracy; indeed, none are
democratic values on a classical view of democracy. The court here in fact assumes a
historically highly contingent conception of liberal democracy where the requirements of
majority rule are tampered by a high degree of social liberalism and perhaps even
permissiveness.
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application, therefore, is not only likely to give rise to judicial
disagreement and inconsistency in adjudication as a matter of practice,
but does so inevitably analytically because there cannot be theoretical
agreement about the meaning.
E. The Essential Contestability of the Concepts Constitutive ofRights
Limitations
Human rights are, of course, subject to limitations of scope. These
limitations take account of the potential for conflict between individual
rights or between rights and public interest and security considerations,
and in effect set the parameters for the judicial resolution of such
conflict. The ECHR does not adopt a single unified approach to limiting
the scope of the rights it protects, but does so in different ways. Two in
particular deserve mention: first, the limitations of ECHR Articles 8 to
11, which are subject to certain qualifying conditions, and, second, the
provision of ECHR Article 15, which allows signatory States to derogate
from part of the ECHR for reasons of war or public emergency. In
practice, however, the degree to which such limitations on the scope of
the rights protected are capable of reducing judicial discretion is only
minimal. It may even be argued that, paradoxically, those apparent
limits on judicial power have had exactly the opposite effect: for, by
allowing the judiciary to show deference to the executive in sensitive
areas such as national security or public order, they have allowed both
the ECtHR and the domestic courts implementing ECHR rights to avoid
political controversy in sensitive policy areas where decisions upholding
human rights might have met with political or public hostility, and thus
have strengthened rather than weakened their ability to adopt a more
expansive approach to human rights in those fashionable areas of social
policy that have little if any direct fiscal implications. 77
The principal reason for the failure of these limitations to rein in
judicial discretion can be found in the persistence of the problem of
conceptual vagueness. Many of the limitations are defined-expressly or
impliedly-with reference to legitimate aims based on concepts that are
just as essentially contestable as those defining the rights they are
designed to qualify. ECHR Articles 8 to 11, for instance, make reference
to a range of legitimate policy objectives whose conceptual vagueness
mirrors rather than reduces that of the rights and liberties to which they
refer and which they are designed to limit. Examples of the legitimate
aims enumerated include the protection of health or morals, protection of
77. This is generally true of laws promoting social equality that may have economic
costs. However, these costs are difficult to quantify and do not commonly have
immediate budgetary implications or effects on personal taxation.
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public order, national security, and the prevention of disorder and crime.
Though some of these concepts are less vague than others, their meaning
cannot be settled objectively, and judges may therefore rightly differ
about their proper use. The problem of vagueness resulting from the
conceptual and empirical indeterminability of key concepts in ECHR
Articles 8 to 11 is exacerbated by the requirement that the qualifications
shall not exceed what is "necessary in a democratic society." Together
with the conceptual ambiguity of the provisions themselves, the inclusion
of the principle of proportionality as an essential condition of any
legitimate qualification of those rights in effect amounts to an invitation
to make value judgments behind the veil of legal objectivity.7 8
An excellent example is provided by the English case of R. (on the
application of Gillian and another) v. Metropolitan Police
Commissioner,79 where the Divisional Court was asked judicially to
review police powers to stop and search under section 44 of the
Terrorism Act 2000. Under the Act, the police may be granted the power
to randomly stop and search individuals without suspecting that the
individual is a terrorist or has been involved in acts of terrorism.8
s
Although the ECHR manifestly asks the courts to carry out a balancing
exercise between individual rights and public security and safety, the
Divisional Court found no reason to question the compatibility of the
blanket stop and search authorization powers with respect to ECHR
Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 and decided the judicial function in scrutinizing a
78. Under the ECHR, judicial discretion in all matters of rights qualifications and the
derogations under Article 15 is complicated further by the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation, which requires the court to defer to a signatory State's interpretation of the
situation in allowing a limitation on the rights guaranteed by the ECHR. The reasoning
behind the doctrine is partly to allow States to make judgment they are better place to
make, but likewise to allow the ECtHR not to get embroiler in political controversies
with national government. The doctrine, however, does not extend to the domestic
situations where national courts are asked to enforce the ECHR against the executive. It
follows that, in relation to the same ECHR right, the ECtHR may justifiably defer to a
national government, while an English court, which must handle domestic controversies,
cannot. The English cases involving national security issues under the HRA framework
suggest that the courts remain reluctant to exercise their enhanced judicial scrutiny and
review function.
79. R. (on the application of Gillian and another) v. Metro. Police Comm'r, [2003]
EWHC (Admin) 2545.
80. The facts of the case were such that the two applicants in Gillian had tried to join
a demonstration against an arms fair but were detained and searched and, as a result,
prevented from joining the demonstration. Both applicants were of good character and
nothing incriminating was found. In one case, the search of the applicant's rucksack
merely yielded a sandwich, notebook, and print-outs, which the police confiscated; the
other applicant was searched in spite of wearing a photographer's jacket and a press pass.
The Divisional Court did not question the decision to grant the authorization, the manner
of its exercise in this particular case.
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power or decision of this kind was necessarily a limited one. 81 In effect,
the court chose to exercise its discretion by not exercising it and
deferring to the authority of the policy-makers despite the ECHR
provisions mandating judicial review of the authorization. In the areas of
public safety and national security-those areas where rights abuses are
arguably most likely to occur and potentially most serious-conceptual
vagueness surrounding the qualifications of and 'he derogation from
ECHR rights appears to have favored excessive judicial deference rather
than judicial activism. Judicial deference and judicial activism, of
course, are the two extreme ends of judicial discretion.
A further, more disquieting, example of the almost complete
freedom enjoyed by judges under the HRA when seeking to balance the
requirements of individual liberty under ECHR Articles 5 and 8 with the
demands of national security and particularly of the higher threshold of
public emergency exigencies under ECHR Article 15 is A v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department. 82 This case involved the issue of a
possible serious breach of the right to liberty under ECHR Article 5 in
connection with the U.K. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of
2001. The Act gives the Home Secretary power to imprison people
indefinitely without trial under the ECHR Article 15 derogation from
ECHR Article 5 "in time of war and of public emergency threatening the
life of the nation." The Special Immigration Appeals Commission
("SIAC"), which was asked at first instance to review the Home
Secretary's decision to make the derogation under ECHR Article 15,
vindicated the executive detention without qualification or reluctance. In
addressing these matters, the SIAC found that there was "a public
emergency threatening the life of the nation" and that "imprisonment
without trial" was "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." 83
Although "no other European country has found it necessary to
derogate," the SIAC found that "the United Kingdom could be
distinguished from its neighbors." 84  This was because the United
Kingdom is regarded "as a prime target" and that an attack against the
United Kingdom would be "devastating. ' ' s
The Court of Appeal appeared to agree with this part of the
decision. Lord Chief Justice Woolf conceded that the threshold for
81. See, e.g., id. 35 ("The assessment of risk to the public safety and to national
security... are primarily for the Government and Parliament on grounds of political
legitimacy.").
82. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1502, [2004] Q.B.
335.
83. Id. at 368-69.
84. Id. at 354.
85. Id.
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derogation under ECHR Article 15 is higher than that required by the
interests of national security built into ECHR Article 5, but concluded
that "the same general approach is clearly appropriate., 86 The Court of
Appeal even overruled the SIAC on the point of the actions taken to deal
with the emergency, ruling that the SIAC had erred in not showing
deference to the executive on this point, too. According to the Lord
Chief Justice:
Whether the Secretary of State was entitled to come to the conclusion
that action was only necessary in relation to non-national suspected
terrorists, who could not be deported, is an issue on which it is
impossible for this court in this case to differ from the Secretary of
State. Decisions as to what is required in the interest of national
security are self-evidently within the category of decisions in relation
to which the court is required to show considerable deference to the
Secretary of State because he is better qualified to make an
assessment as to what action is called for.
87
The House of Lords later departed from the established practice of
judicial deference in national security and emergency cases and
overruled the Court of Appeal, but this only reinforces the image of
unbridled judicial discretion on a central issue of civil liberties. Besides,
an appeal to the House of Lords does not lie as of right and in any event
will often be beyond the reach of most litigants who are neither publicly
funded nor possess the deep pockets of public bodies and private
corporations.
Remarkably, in both cases the courts at first and second instance
were simply able to avoid a politically sensitive issue and potential clash
with the executive by choosing not to exercise a crystal-clear duty to
review both legislative and executive measures under the HRA. The
reasons for this near complete freedom lie both in the vagueness of the
underlying concepts and the absence of any common standard into which
the respective gains and losses in liberty and security could be translated
and thus compared. In these circumstances, judges are given no
guidance as to how much security can and should be traded for liberty.
Judicial trade-offs between incommensurable values thus remain
unconstrained by rational choice because it cannot be demonstrated that
the loss of liberty entailed by some measures is either greater or more
limited than the correlative gains in security. No one can say how much
security is enough, how many X units of liberty should be sacrificed for
Y gains in security, and where a point may be reached at which the
suspension of civil liberties in the name of making democracy safe will
86. Id. at 361.
87. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] Q.B. at 359.
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actually transform the democratic order into a state which is no longer
concerned with civil liberties and thus less worthy of protection in their
name.
Believers in legal certainty, of course, will point out that such trade-
offs need not be arbitrary, but are made with reference to legal principles.
The rationality of judicial trade-offs between conflicting rights thus
depends crucially on the clarity and precision of the legal principles that
may resolve rights clashes. The alleged autonomy of these principles
and their ability to fill the gaps where legal rules run out-a position
associated in particular with Dworkin-is central to the final argument
that human rights are not, after all, simply what judges say they are.
F. The Conceptual Indeterminability of Legal Principles
A problem common to all legal systems consists in the need for
legal certainty in situations where legal rules run out either because of
their lack of precision or the vagueness. Central to both civil law and
common law systems is the assumption that in these circumstances, legal
principles can provide objective rules capable of constraining judicial
discretion. Legal principles, however, can provide such answers that
escape the pluralistic dilemma, only if they are not subject to conceptual
vagueness and can be divorced from appeal to underlying normative
considerations. Neither is the case.
All human rights instruments include or presuppose certain general
principles of law. In the case of the ECHR, examples include the
principle of proportionality, which governs the application of most rights
and acts as an express or implied condition of any judicial trade-off
between ECHR rights and their limitations, including national security
and public emergency considerations, the principle of non-discrimination
as enshrined to ECHR Article 14, and the general principle of fairness
governing the fair trial guarantees under ECHR Article 6.
The principle of proportionality requires a reasonable relation
between the goal pursued and the means used. Courts often use it as a
vehicle for conducting a balancing exercise between the demands of
conflicting individual right or rights and its recognized security or other
limitations. The principle of proportionality, however, does not directly
balance the right against the reason for interfering with it. Instead, it
balances the nature and extent of the interference against the reasons for
interfering. As a matter of judicial practice, the principle of
proportionality may thus serve as a useful reminder to look hard and
critically at draconian measures a beleaguered government may be
tempted to adopt in the face of perceived security threats or at measures
singling out particular groups or individuals for unusually harsh
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treatment. However, it cannot resolve genuine value conflicts or provide
legal certainty in judicial trade-offs in such cases for several reasons.
Above all, the principle of proportionality can only come into
operation once a specific aim has been selected, which implies that in the
conflict between two rights, e.g., between privacy and freedom of choice,
or between individual rights and national security, as in the above
English cases where national security and emergency grounds were held
to justify far-reaching infractions of ECHR rights, a basic choice
favoring one value over others has to be made by the judges even before
any discussion of proportionality. In these cases, security was
prioritized, and proportionality could come into play only as a means of
assessing whether certain measures involving losses of individual liberty
were suitable, but no more than necessary to achieving the selected aim.
However, this is possible only if there is transitivity between the various
rights and interests concerned. In the absence of value transitivity,
however, all judicial value transactions amount to short change.
The same is true of purported trade-offs between privacy and
freedom of expression. In Von Hannover v. Germany,88 the court
referenced the proportionality of the interference, but it is not possible to
express in common currency the comparative normative or legal weight
of the subjective discomfort resulting from intrusions into a person's
privacy set against the aggregate loss resulting from restrictions of
freedom of expression. Moreover, in many cases, the choice between
ECHR right or rights and national security is an all-or-nothing choice: a
demonstration under ECHR Article 1 1 is either to be allowed or to be
prohibited, an article invading another's privacy is either to be published
or not, and, if the recent headscarf debate in both France and the United
Kingdom is to be finally resolved judicially, the right to follow religious
precept is either to prevail or give way to countervailing public order
considerations.
A particularly striking example of the misuse of the proportionality
principle in order to establish whether there has been a breach of an
ECHR right is the case of Van Kiick v. Germany.89 The case involved a
claim by a transsexual for reimbursement of her gender re-assignment
surgery by her private medical insurance. The ECtHR purportedly did
not make any finding regarding the entitlement to such expenses, but
found that the requirement to prove the necessity of surgery and
"genuine nature" of the applicant's condition was disproportionate and in
conflict with her right to self-determination. Leaving aside that there is
no such right under the ECHR, it is unclear what, if anything, could be
88. Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 294.
89. Van Kiick v. Germany, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 73.
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described as disproportionate. Instead, the appropriate principle to apply
in the case should have been the principle of non-discrimination in order
to establish if the applicant had been treated discriminatorily by reference
to others placed in an analogous position.
Finally, proportionality assessments as to what is necessary to
achieve an appropriate goal often require detailed or technical knowledge
that judges rarely possess or find difficult to evaluate. Moreover, in
national security cases, not all the relevant information is usually made
available to courts. Lack of information and technical expertise often
reinforce and strengthen pre-ex:isting judicial dispositions to show
significant deference to political authority in national security cases. The
English cases referred to above are but few of many examples.
The principle of equality as non-discrimination is another key
principle found in most charters of rights. In the ECHR, it is enshrined
in Article 14, which prohibits discrimination on any grounds with respect
to all ECHR rights and adds a non-exclusive list of particular
discriminatory grounds which are prohibited.90 The basic idea behind
ECHR Article 14 seems clear: an applicant must establish that he is
subject to a difference in treatment from others in a comparable,
analogous, or "relevantly similar"91 position in the enjoyment of one of
the rights guaranteed under the ECHR unless that difference in treatment
can be objectively and reasonably justified. The proviso is not part of the
provision, but has been recognized by the ECtHR and national courts
applying the ECHR as a public interest or public policy exception of the
last resort. A ready example is provided by aforementioned case of A v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department,92 where the Court of
Appeal held that discrimination against non-British nationals who could
be detained without trial (the legislation excluded the detainment of
nationals) could be justified on the ground that, by taking such limited
powers, the Home Secretary had done no more than was strictly
necessary for the exigencies of the situation. It is as if ECHR Article 15
required the Home Secretary to discriminate notwithstanding the terms
of ECHR Article 14 .
A further source of conceptual and normative uncertainty is the
vagueness of the non-discrimination principle itself. It arises in
90. The inclusion of some of those discriminatory grounds, such as property, is
patently absurd, as personal wealth obviously affects the ability to seek legal address and
advice or indeed the extent of one's private sphere from which one may have a fight to
exclude others, while the inclusion of both race and color is superfluous.
91. See Marckx v. Belgium, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1979).
92. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] Q.B 335.
93. K.D. Ewing, The Futility of the Human Rights Act 1998, PuB. L., Winter 2004, at
842.
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particular over what precisely counts as "comparable" or "analogous,"
for it is the answer to this question that decides which cases should be
treated alike and which will be treated differently. A good example is
provided by those cases in which national governments sought to justify
differential treatment of children born out of and in wedlock and of
unmarried and married couples. Inze v. Austria94 and Mazureck v.
France95 both concerned the issue of inheritance rights of illegitimate
children, and the ECtHR held in both cases that differential treatment of
children born in and out of wedlock was a breach of ECHR Article 14 in
conjunction with ECHR Article 8. By contrast, on several occasions, the
court accepted arguments that married couples were not in an analogous
position with unmarried couples and affirmed that marriage had a special
status that grounded a distinct corpus of rights and obligations. Specific
examples have arisen in particular in cases involving differences in the
parental rights and responsibility over children accruing to natural fathers
as compared to married and divorced fathers. On the whole, the court
has accepted that differential treatment of natural fathers was justified in
view of the difference in the nature of relationships of fathers with
children born out of wedlock.9 6 It is clear that together with the
"objective and reasonably justified" proviso, the "relevantly similar
situation" criterion, developed by the ECtHR as a test to distinguish
between material differences and similarities for the purposes of ECHR
Article 14, gives the court considerable flexibility in refusing to extend
the equality of treatment principle to cases where it considers
discriminatory treatment justified on the grounds of social or economic
policy. The courts here effectively assume the role of policy-makers.
Fairness is the overriding principle for the determination of the
specific procedural justice guarantees of ECHR Article 6. In theory, the
right to a fair hearing is absolute with no expressed qualifications. In
practice, however, it is qualified by the inherent vagueness of the concept
of fairness which has allowed the ECtHR to avoid politically contentious
decisions and show deference to national legal traditions. The
availability of legal aid or reasonable contingency fees arrangements, for
example, is undeniably one of the most important facilities for aggrieved
parties to secure effective access to a court in the determination of their
civil rights. Yet, unsurprisingly, the court has acknowledged no general
right to receive legal aid or access to affordable fees arrangements exists
except in highly exceptional circumstances.
97
94. Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1987).
95. Mazurek v. France, 2000-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
96. McMichael v. United Kingdom, 307 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1995).
97. Circumstances such as extreme complexity of proceedings or cases where legal
representation is compulsory. See KAREN REID, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE
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National courts, in applying the ECHR, have likewise utilized the
"fairness and impartiality" requirement under ECHR Article 6 to avoid
making decisions with budgetary implications or that would conflict with
established national legal and judicial traditions. A good example is
provided by the Alconbury decision of the House of Lords,98 which
involved a challenge to the entire U.K. planning system on the grounds
that the reserve jurisdiction of the Secretary of State over planning
appeal decisions was in breach of ECHR Article 6(1). The House
dismissed the challenge. Central to their lordships' conclusion was the
claim that in democracies decisions concerning the general interest
should be made by democratically accountable bodies.99 Planning
decisions, they opined, fall into that category and so properly fall within
the remit of the decision-making powers of the Secretary of State. As
political theory, the court's conclusions may be convincing to political
freshmen, but as a matter of law it remains unclear how a tribunal that
the Government created for the purpose of deciding disputes between
planning authorities and developers, which involve the interpretation of
government legislation and planning policy, may be regarded as
impartial when the Secretary of State reserves to itself the right to "call
in" any decision by the planning tribunal hearing the case.
Indeed, the fact that government quite appropriately legislates for
the public interest in such matters or formulates policy documents on this
basis in no way means that there neither should nor could be a check on
the application of that policy, which is independent of the policy-maker.
For example, in conflicts between ECHR Articles 10 and 8, the courts
are constantly asked to adjudicate whether the disclosure of personal
information or other speech requires protection in the general interest.
The same applies in relation to other cases involving the right to property
under Article 1 of ECHR Protocol 1 or the public interest exceptions to
the right to private life, which are unrelated to ECHR Article 10. Why,
therefore, is it not desirable, possible or appropriate for planning
tribunals to decide what the public interest requires in specific cases that
planning inspectors decide on the basis of government legislation, policy,
and guidelines? This is a question their lordships do not answer, but it is
testimony to the degree of discretion afforded by the principles of
fairness and impartiality in the context of the putatively absolute, non-
derogable fair trail guarantee of ECHR Article 6.
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2004).
98. Regina (Alconbury Dev. Ltd. & Others) v. Sec'y of State for the Env't, Transp.
& the Regions, [2001] UKHL 23, [2003] A.C. 295.
99. Id. at 325 (Lord Hoffman, J., concurring).
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IV. Conclusion
Rights are not worded sufficiently precisely to prevent clashes, nor
are legal principles sufficiently clear, autochthonous, and hierarchical to
overcome the dependence of human rights adjudication on
foundationalist values, and neither can they escape the normative
dilemmas and conceptual vagueness and ambiguities attendant to those
foundationalist values. In many clashes between legally recognized
rights, no less than in the theoretical sphere of conflict between
alternative sets of rights derived from rivalrous pluralistic values, there
will always be cases where choices between conflicting rights can only
be justified in terms of the values underlying these rights. Thus for as
long as the human rights defacto recognized in human rights instruments
are capable of colliding and, in addition, might also collide with public
security or other public interest requirements, the philosophical dilemma
of value pluralism remains relevant to the judicial and political choices
that need be made in such cases. Competing pluralistic values are
ethically and legally indeterminate and cannot furnish detailed
prescriptions of how rights may be best balanced. Value pluralism
means that indeterminacy in human rights adjudication is not merely an
unavoidable consequence of legislative and judicial fallibility but a
practical result of normative necessity.
It is common to draw a distinction, often a stark one, between the
issue of a philosophical justification for human rights, which is regarded
as the remit of philosophers, and the less abstract issue of bringing
coherence into judicial and political human rights language as the basis
and criticism for adjudication and legislation. This strict juxtaposition is
mistaken: The foregoing discussion has shown that the normative and
conceptual contestability of human rights not only raises fundamental
normative questions about the justification for judicial value judgments;
it likewise calls into question the very basis for the distinction between
political and judicial judgments as both seem inescapably wedded to
value judgments. Judicial decisions defining the meaning of individual
rights or balancing the countervailing requirements of competing rights
and between rights and their limitations lack both a distinctive
justificatory legal and normative foundation. They lack certainty not
simply as a matter of experience but by logical necessity and
consequently share the characteristics of political decisions and
balancing acts, just as any bill of rights must be regarded as essentially a
political document to the extent to which its provisions are incapable of
rational justification in terms of a coherent ideal of human ends, but
explicable above all in terms of political choices made in a particular
political and social context. However, value pluralism and conceptual
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uncertainty do not only provide a useful theoretical framework for
analyzing the use and abuse of judicial discretion in human rights
adjudication; they likewise undermine the idea of human rights as
ultimate legal values in a society characterized by ethical pluralism.
For there is nothing that renders human rights normatively less
contentious or more suited for judicial enforcement than many other
moral or political concepts. Human rights therefore lack the overriding
normative status that is commonly assumed in justifying their privileged
legal status, and they likewise lack the attributes of clarity, precision, or
non-reducibility that would facilitate or allow for their justiciability
through judicial adjudication in a way in which the conceptual structure
of other moral claims does not. Where there are no moral absolutes, the
defense of the priority of the right over the good fails, and the
justification of human rights and of their exemption from the democratic
process seems morally arbitrary.
Human rights are justifiable either if they are based on absolute
moral truths, as in natural law thinking, or on non-foundationalist
grounds. Analogously to the concepts of representative democracy and
separation of powers, which are not commonly defended on a priori
normative grounds, but in terms of outcome and their ability to reduce
the danger of abuses of power and provide a widely accepted framework
for settling conflicts between divergent interests and opinion, so human
rights and the role of the courts in their enforcement may in the second
sense be capable of justification in terms of their contribution to the
institutionalization of a liberalism of fear, that is, a political framework
of checks and balances designed to protect public decision-making as far
as possible against the invasion by private interests and prevent
institutionally sanctioned cruelty and violence and the crippling effects
of the fear that comes from fear. It is difficult to imagine how the current
inflation of human rights and human rights language and the quasi-
gubernatorial role assumed by the courts as the praetors between
divergent social norms and moral values in most areas that do not have
obvious or significant fiscal implications can be defended on those
grounds. In circumstances where courts have generally shown deference
and restraint in areas of high politics where human rights violations are
potentially most serious and they have often been most activist in areas
of subtler discrimination and social and media pressure, the courts have
often taken rights most seriously where they matter least and have been
far less assertive where rights matter most in the sense that they protect
basic human interests. The use, or abuse, of judicial discretion to this
effect is inseparable from conceptual vagueness surrounding human
rights concepts and the inevitable value conflicts between a multiplicity
of values of equal or incommensurable status. In these circumstances, it
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is difficult not to think that less would be more.

